I ask whether access to high-interest credit (payday loans) exacerbates or mitigates individual financial distress. Using natural disasters as an exogenous shock, I apply a propensity score matched, triple difference specification to identify a causal relationship between access-to-credit and welfare. I find that California foreclosures increase by 4.5 units per 1,000 homes in the year after a natural disaster, but the existence of payday lenders mitigates 1.0-1.3 of these foreclosures. In a placebo test for natural disasters covered by homeowner insurance, I find no payday lending mitigation effect. Lenders also mitigate larcenies, but have no effect on burglaries or vehicle thefts. My methodology demonstrates that my results apply to ordinary personal emergencies, with the caveat that not all payday loan customers borrow for emergencies.
There is little debate that access to …nance enhances value for …rms. …nancial institutions may cater to these biases (Campbell, 2006) , and access to …nance may make borrowers worse o¤.
In this paper, I study the welfare e¤ects of access to distress …nance for credit constrained individuals around a community natural experiment. The primary providers of distress …nance for constrained households are payday lenders, who o¤er short-term, small dollar advances intended to sustain individuals to the next payday. The fees charged in payday lending annualize to implied rates well over 400%. I ask whether these 400+% loans mitigate or exacerbate the e¤ect of …nancial distress on individuals' welfare as measured by foreclosures and small property crimes.
How can small shocks lead to such drastic outcomes? Individuals frequently experience some sort of personal emergency (e.g., an out-of pocket medical expense or car breakdown) leaving them without cash for their short-term obligations. Without access to credit, these small-scale personal emergencies can lead to bounced checks, late fees, utility suspensions, repossessions, and, in some cases, foreclosures, evictions and bankruptcies. The United States works very much on a fee-based system for delinquencies, such that once low-margin individuals get into distress, they often end up in a cycle of debt. With up to 20% of U.S. residents …nancially constrained, the importance of knowing the welfare implications of payday lending is likely to be both timely and large.
Fifteen percent of U.S. residents have borrowed from payday lenders in a market that now provides over $50 billion in loans each year. 2 Despite (or because of) the growing demand, State and Federal authorities are working towards regulating and curbing the supply of payday lending. Thus far, …fteen States prohibit payday lending.
From one perspective, payday lenders should help distressed individuals bridge …nan-cial shortfalls by enabling them to smooth liquidity shocks, a welfare-enhancing propo-1 e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) sition. An opposite perspective is that payday lending destroys welfare. The availability of cash from payday loans may tempt individuals to over-consume. An individual who is likely to fall to temptation may prefer the discipline of lacking access to cash before temptation arises (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001; ; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 2006; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006) . A related argument is that because individuals may be naive about time-inconsistent preferences, they may spend with a bias toward the present moment (e.g., Jones, 1960; Thaler, 1990 ; Attanasio and Browning, 1995; Stephens, 2006) or be unable to save adequately (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, 1981 ; Laibson, 1997; Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman, 1998; Choi, Laibson and Madrian, 2005) . Cash (or access to cash) from payday lending may encourage either present-biased consumption or a lack of saving. In these views, payday lending can be welfare-destroying. 3 To answer whether payday lending exacerbates or mitigates the welfare e¤ect of distress, I use natural disasters as a community-level natural experiment. I perform the analysis at the zip code level for the State of California during 1996-2002. The di¢ -culty in measuring how payday lending impacts welfare over time is in disentangling a causal payday lender e¤ect from endogenous location decisions of lenders and from correlated community economic circumstances causing welfare outcomes. To overcome the endogeneities, I set up a matched triple di¤erence framework. The matching aligns communities on the propensity of residents to be …nancially constrained prior to the natural experiment. I generate these propensities at the zip code level by estimating the probability that an individual in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is …nancially constrained as a function of socioeconomic characteristics. I then project the relationship onto zip codes by apply the SCF coe¢ cients to Census socioeconomic variables observed at the community level.
Matching alone does not solve the endogeneities of lender location decision, but does facilitate a counterfactual framework using a triple di¤erence (di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in di¤erences) speci…cation. The key exogeneity assumption is that the non-disaster communities provide an unbiased benchmark of how lender and non-lender communities would have di¤ered in welfare growth had they not been hit by a disaster. Thus, by subtracting this benchmark from the observed lender minus non-lender welfare growth for disaster communities, I can di¤erence away endogeneities associated with the observed existence of a lender in a location.
The results indicate that payday lenders o¤er a positive service to individuals facing …nancial distress. Natural disasters increase foreclosures by 4.5 units per 1,000 homes in the year following the event, but payday lenders mitigate 1.0 to 1.3 units of this increase.
In rate terms, natural disasters increase the rate of foreclosures per home from 0.972% to 1.5% in my sample of zip codes. (As a comparison, the 2009 foreclosure rate for California was 1.88% following the …nancial crisis.) Lenders mitigate 0.10% to 0.12% of the disaster-induced increase, after controlling for a number of di¤erent resiliency stories. In a placebo test for natural disasters covered by homeowner insurance, I …nd no payday lending mitigation e¤ect. The results also indicate that payday lenders alleviate individuals'need to resort to small property crimes in times of …nancial distress. I …nd signi…cant results, however, for only for larceny (shoplifting), the crime which carries the least sentencing of all property crimes.
My experimental design necessitates a caveat in how these results can be interpreted. 
Payday Lending Market
To take out a payday loan, an individual visits a payday lender with her most recent paycheck stub and bank statement. (The unbanked and unemployed do not qualify.) A typical loan is $350 with a fee of $50. For a $350 loan, the borrower writes a check (or authorizes a bank draw) for $400, post-dating it to her payday, usually 10-14 days hence.
The fee is posted on the wall as a dollar fee per $100 in loan. The implied annual interest rate is usually over 400%, which is disclosed at the closing of the transaction in the loan paperwork. The payday lender veri…es employment and bank information, but does not run a formal credit check. On payday, if the individual is not able to cover the check, which happens more often than not, she returns to the payday store and re…nances the loan, incurring another $50 fee, which is paid in cash.
To put payday borrowing in context, one has to consider why borrowers do not seek cheaper forms of …nance. Research covering the last three decades …nds that up to 20% of U.S. residents are credit constrained (Hall and Mishkin, 1982; Hubbard and Judd, 1986; Zeldes, 1989; Jappelli, 1990; Gross and Souleles, 2002) . When expense or income shocks arrive, banks and credit cards usually do not provide these constrained borrowers with distress loans. Default risk and transaction costs make these loans infeasible without lenders coming into con ‡ict with usury laws or the threat of greater regulation.
Individuals restricted in access to credit resort to borrowing from high interest lenders.
These fringe …nancial institutions are only sparsely studied in the …nance literature (see Caskey, 1994; 2005) , despite the fact that payday lending alone issues an estimated $50 billion in loans per year (Los Angeles Times, December 24, 2008) . Loans collateralized by car titles (title loans) and household assets (pawn shop loans) o¤er cheaper alternatives, but because these loans require clear ownership of valuable assets, the markets are much smaller.
The main alternatives to payday lending for individuals in distress are bank overdraft loans and bounced checks. Bouncing checks (or over-extending on debit cards) to buy a few days of ‡oat is still a very common way to borrow funds. Although the APR cost depends on the duration and the number of checks bounced, bouncing checks is usually near to the cost of taking out a payday loan. Bouncing checks also adds an implicit cost for a negative entry on one's credit history, which does not happen in payday borrowing.
Bank overdraft loans di¤er from bounced checks in that banks pre-agree to clear the overdraft check(s) for a fee. Overdraft loans are cheaper for the borrower than bouncing checks since the borrower gains more time to re-pay the debt. Nevertherless, the overdraft fees can be quite high in APR terms, especially if the checks overdrafted were for small face values. The majority of my sample pre-dates widespread availability of overdraft loans, especially for the individuals with poor credit history and/or no direct deposit to whom the bank may not o¤er overdraft loans. The moral of this quick description of the market is that, for the majority of people in my sample, no obvious alterative to a payday loan exists.
Empirical Methodology
The goal of the analysis is to test to what extent the existence of a lender mitigates or exacerbates the e¤ect of …nancial distress on welfare outcomes. Although I later aggregate to (and estimate at) a community level, the story is one of individuals in distress. Thus, I start with a fairly general depiction of individual distress and welfare.
Equation (1) is an individual …xed e¤ects model of welfare growth in which …nancial distress (f , an indicator) linearly a¤ects welfare growth, and the existence of a highinterest lender (L) can mitigate or exacerbate the situation:
t w izt denotes the change in a welfare outcome for individual i in zip code z at time t, where t refers to a time …rst di¤erencing from t 1 to t. I refer to the time change as welfare growth. ). An example to have in mind is that a personal emergency occurs when the transmission in one's car gives out for someone who depends on the car to get to work but does not have the cash or credit to repair it. A natural disaster distress example is when a similar person's car ‡oods, leaving her with a large bill to repair the car to usability.
Since it is possible to have both types of distress occurring at the same time, the appropriate indicator variable breakdown is:
A bene…t from this decomposition is that f dis izt is unrelated to the location decision of the lender. One might be worried that lenders might chase disasters or prefer disaster-prone areas, but this is not empirically supported: the correlation between the occurrence of a disaster and the existence of a lender is 0.005. Lenders depend on borrowers with personal emergency needs for pro…ts, not those whose needs for …nance only occur after extreme events.
I next aggregate the model to the community (zip code) level and average over the community population n zt . The average number of personal emergency distresses among 4 Elliehausen and Lawrence's (2001) survey evidence …nds that individuals do not travel far to go to a lender. For densely-populated areas, the next community may only be a short distance away; thus, in estimation, I drop densely populated areas. 5 Another problem is that the residuals can be serially correlated, but this problem can be handled with relatively more ease.
community members is equivalent to the propensity of any individual in the community to be …nancially constrained due to personal emergencies, which I denote by zt ; where 
where t W zt
and " zt
. The …xed e¤ect z is now the mean community welfare growth absent lenders and distress. In the empirical section, I refer
as the variable Distress zt , and thus equation (2) can be written:
Counterfactual Framework
The distress decomposition and aggregation to the community level do not solve problems of lender location endogeneity and omitted variable bias inherent in equation (1) .
However, equation (2) does facilitate a counterfactual framework to solve these problems using a matching and di¤erencing approach. A counterfactual framework, originating in the statistics and program evaluation studies of Neyman(1923) and Rubin (1974) , is a experimental treatment design in which the treatment e¤ect is assessed against an estimation of the counterfactual had the individual not be subject to the treatment. Under this frame, the basic idea of my identi…cation strategy is that I can use the di¤erence in welfare growth for lender communities compared to non-lender communities in areas not hit by a disaster as a matched benchmark for what the lender-versus-non-lender welfare di¤erential in a disaster area would have looked like had no disaster occurred.
To illustrate how the counterfactual setup works, I …rst need some labels. I denote the communities that have been or will be hit by natural disaster with treat (for treated), and those not ever a¤ected by a natural disaster with cntrl (for control). I mark communities that have access to a lender with a subscript L, and those with no access, with N .
For each control community with access to a lender, imagine choosing another control community with no lender, where the pair matches in time and on the propensity of the residents to be in personal emergency distress. Focusing on one particular pair of communities with no natural disaster, suppose cntrl Lt = cntrl N t t . Di¤erencing the matched pair using equation (2) gives a di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) estimator of the di¤erence in welfare growth for lender versus non-lender areas for these control communities:
The left hand side is the di¤erence in welfare growth from t 1 to t between the community with a lender and the community with no lender, where communities are matched on t and in time. The equation says that this di¤erence is equal to The same matching exercise for a set of treatment communities yields a DID estimator:
As in the control case, I cannot interpret this DID estimator causally. Welfare growth may di¤er in locations with payday lender compared to locations without lenders for reasons unrelated to any …nancial distress caused by disasters. This does not rule out the possibility that the welfare reaction to disaster distress could be causally impacted by access to a lender, but the DID estimate in equation (4) would capture both the endogenous and the causal e¤ect of having a lender in the community.
The key identi…cation insight is, however, that the control group equation (3) is the counterfactual for how the lender and non-lender communities would have di¤ered in welfare growth had there been no natural disaster. A …nal di¤erencing subtracts the DID estimate of equation (3) from the DID estimate of equation (4). After averaging m = 1;...; M matches of 4 communities at a point in time, the resulting triple di¤erence of welfare growth is:
where
m is the average propensity to be credit constrained across all sets of matches M , and
' 0; which I defend in the next section. 6 The essence of the counterfactual framework is that although the lender locations are probably endogenous with respect to welfare growth, these endogeneities exist in the same way for matched disaster and non-disaster communities and can be di¤erenced out during estimation. All that is left after the triple di¤erencing is the impact of lenders mitigating or exacerbating distress following a disaster, 3 ; times the proportion of individuals not already in distress on average across the M sets of matched communities,
.
Regression Framework
How is = 3 (1 ) estimated? An estimating equation similar to equation (2) provides the answer:
The only things new are that the community …xed e¤ects are omitted, because I estimate a collapsed equation with only one observation of t W zt per zip code in the time dimension, 7 and the data are limited to the matched sets of communities. We can now 6 The community …xed e¤ects ( consider the properties of the OLS estimator.
The vector of right hand side variables x z (including the constant) for observation z is :
The OLS vector of estimates is b = (X 0 X) 1 X 0 Y: Solving for b 3 using the matrices above
Rearranging and averaging over all M sets of four community matches brings us back to
This demonstrates that an OLS estimate of equation (6) gives the triple di¤erencing solution. It is now easy to show what is required for the estimate to be unbiased, i.e., for E(" j X) = 0. Using the X matrix above, 3 will be an unbiased estimator if
cntrl N = 0, or in terms of all possible matches:
What this relies on is that any endogeneities between the lender location and the error term are same for disaster and non-disaster areas, or
m correlates with the existence of a lender, L z : If so, the estimates c 2 and c 3 causally measure the e¤ect of distress on welfare and the extent to which …nancial distress is mitigated or exacerbated by the existence of a lender. The properties in a standard di¤erence-indi¤erences setup for this to be true are now fairly innocuous: there must be a su¢ ciently large sample of zip codes, and natural disasters must hit randomly.
Possible Disaster Omitted Variables & Other Robustness
The matched triple di¤erence framework leaves one dimension in which an omitted variable may be problematic. An argument could be made that reactions to a disaster di¤er across communities only in the case of a natural disaster in a way that could be correlated with the existence of a lender. For this to be a problem, it must be that this reaction is speci…c to disasters as opposed to personal emergencies. Three potential stories help to illustrate this argument, which I call disaster resiliency.
A …rst story is that lenders locate in communities with more (or less) adhesive community or family ties that provide support during disasters. This support during disasters would have to be di¤erent than the support during personal …nancial distresses, such as helping family or neighbors cope with health expenses or job losses. This seems unlikely.
The other two stories emerge from the possibility that lenders locate in communities in which the commercial activity is up-and-coming rather than declining, and this characteristic of the community only di¤erentiates a community during a natural disaster relative to its personal emergency matched community. Both stories build on the intuition that since payday lenders largest expense is default and since default occurs more in areas where people become unemployed, payday lenders prefer up-and-coming areas, all else equal.
The …rst of these stories concerns the e¤ect of the disaster on property damage directly. Suppose in up-and-coming communities, land quickly becomes valuable. While people invest in existing properties upgrading the structures over time, this does not happen as rapidly as the land price increase in desirable locations. This would imply that disasters a¤ect the up-and-coming areas, all else equal, less because disasters presumably impact structures more than they destroy land value. 8 The other up-and-coming story concerns what type of economy the community is.
Suppose two communities have the same propensity to be …nancially constrained, but a lender chooses to locate in the one with a vibrant service sector rather than one with a declining manufacturing sector. When a natural disaster strikes, the service sector might re-trench quickly, whereas a manufacturing sector in decline might just face an accelerated demise.
To take the omitted variable concern of these stories seriously, I implement two further steps from my speci…cation. First, I construct multiple controls for the damage caused 8 I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
by the disaster, controlling both for the property damage of each disaster and for the damage to commercial activity in the communities. Second, I allow for a di¤erential e¤ect of disasters along the gradients of lagged building permit values (to address story two) and the extent to the service-orientation of the community (to address story three).
I discuss these variables in more detail in the results section.
In addition to the concern over resiliency, the formulation imposes that the predicted welfare impact from a natural disaster is higher for communities with lower initial levels of personal emergencies. To see this, image that I estimate a coe¢ cient c 2 . The predicted impact of a disaster for a non-lender community with a low propensity to be credit constrained, c 2 (1 LOW ); will be higher than that for one with a high propensity, c 2 (1 HIGH ); because more people in high personal emergency areas were already in distress. Realistically, we would expect people in poorer areas to be more vulnerable to natural disaster distress, not less.
However, this is not going to be much of a concern for interpreting my results since the vast majority of the variation in Distress comes from whether or not a disaster occurs (the standard deviation around is much smaller than around f dis ), implying that the di¤erential in e¤ect for high and low areas is very small. Nevertheless, I show robustness of my results to a standard di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation around the natural disaster itself rather than around the Distress variable, i.e.:
Matching
The methodology section called for a matching of zip codes on , the propensity of indi- Table 1 presents the logistic estimation of the probability of being …nancially constrained on these socioeconomic variables. The logistic estimates predict correctly whether an individual is …nancially constrained 89% of the time. I only brie ‡y highlight some of the coe¢ cients and refer interested readers to Jappelli (1990) and Calem and Mester (1995) .
The coe¢ cients in Table 1 should be interpreted as "compared to a wealthy, very educated, single male senior."For all three dependent variables, the probability of being …nancially constrained is highest in the $15,000 -$45,000 range. 
Data and Summary Statistics
I limit the analysis to the State of California to make use of panel micro data available for payday lenders and welfare variables and to isolate the analysis in a single regulatory environment. I drop the big city counties to focus on areas where crossing zip code lines is not done as a course of everyday business and on areas where my crime data are more precise (described below). In particular, I throw out 11 large city-counties (out of a total of 58) with a population over 800,000 people. I choose this threshold to drop all counties with populations equal to or greater than that of San Francisco County. 11 The time period of the analysis is 1996-2002.
Natural Disaster Data
Natural disaster data come from the University of South Carolina's Sheldus Hazard database, which provides the location (by county), type ( ‡ood, wild…re, etc.), and magnitude The Hazard database contains all natural disasters which cause more than $50,000 of property damage. The average zip code incurs $12.6 million in property damage with the median being only $391,000. (Note that if a disaster impacts more than one zip code, the property damage is divided out according to population.)
I include a breakdown of the disaster statistics according to the insurance coverage available and utilized in California. 12 The category of earthquakes, ‡oods and landslides 11 The dropped counties are Los Angeles, San Diego, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa Clara, Alameda, Sacramento, Contra Costa, Fresno, Ventura, and San Francisco. 12 The breakdown of which disasters are e¤ectively covered in California comes from a series of in- 
Payday Lender Data
The Table 2 presents the community level summary statistics for payday lenders. The …rst row shows that mean (median) zip code has 2.00 (1) payday lenders. The empirical design is based on the yes/no question of whether payday lenders exist in the zip code community, which is equivalent to being above or below median. Figure 1 depicts the mapping of 2002 payday locations to the zip codes, together with the propensities of communities to be credit constrained. The larger the dots on the zip code, the greater the density of lenders. The minimum size dot indicates no lenders are in the zip code. The zip code shadings re ‡ect the credit constrained propensities; the higher the propensity to be credit constrained, the darker the color.
Because zip codes are of varying size and density of commercial activity, I use a second set of measures of payday loans for robustness. Namely, I construct the number of lenders within a radius of 10 or 20 miles from the center of the zip code using the GIS plotting of payday stores. As Table 2 presents, these are much larger numbers, with the mean (median) number of lenders within 10 miles being 72.6 (37.5) and within 20 miles being 215.9 (101.5). In the estimation, I use the log of these variables to o¤er a (non-skewed) continuous measure of payday density.
Welfare Data
For foreclosures to be a measure of welfare, it must be that individuals'utilities decline when their homes are foreclosed upon. Admittedly, having one's house foreclosed on can be e¢ cient in some circumstances, even taking into account the large transaction costs involved. A general rule is that a foreclosure is ine¢ cient if the present value of the homeowner's income is su¢ cient to cover the present value of consumption, including housing consumption, but the homeowner lacks access to credit to smooth consumption using future income as collateral. In my empirical design, the matched triple di¤erences subtracts out the general pattern of foreclosures for similar communities (with the nondisaster areas) and the e¤ect of disasters on forcing foreclosures (with the disaster, nonlender communities), thus isolating only …nancial distress-forcing foreclosures.
I use quarterly residential foreclosures in a zip code recorded by the California Association of Realtors, available at RAND Statistics during each quarter from 1996-2002.
As per my methodology, the dependent variable is changes in foreclosure rates. To get to rates, I divide foreclosures by the total number of owner-occupied housing in a zip code community available from the Census. Table 2, Table 2 reports that the mean larcenies, vehicle thefts and burglaries per household are respectively 60.8, 11.14 and 20.4 in the matched sample. The summary statistics are winsorized, removing only 0.5% of the sample on each end, outliers which act anticonservatively in estimation. Returning to the question of disaster mitigation in Table 2 , column 2 suggests that communities with lenders experience an overall increase in foreclosures after disasters but much less so (only 1.1 -0.45 = 0.65 more foreclosures) compared to matched communities experiencing disasters without access to a lender. In column 3, the continuous variable (log of) Lenders 10 M iles also has explanatory power, mitigating the e¤ect of disasters.
Results

Baseline Foreclosure Results
The mitigation e¤ect is equally strong economically: -0.131 times the Lenders 10 M ile 13 And because using Disaster rather than Distress does not have the odd implication that disaster increases distress more in wealthy communities than in poor ones standard deviation of 1.93 is similar to -0.450 times the standard deviation of Lenders of 0.50. However, as one might expect, the results erode at the 20 mile radius in column 4. Before jumping to interpretation of these e¤ects, I …rst need to get a comfort level with the result by addressing resiliency.
Resiliency Variables
One could make an argument that disaster resiliency may be driving the disaster mitigation e¤ect of payday lenders found in Table 3 . Both of the up-and-coming stories presented have a hypothesis consistent with the results. To address this concern, …rst, I control for the disaster economic e¤ect directly using the property damage caused by the storm (from Sheldus), the change in quarterly housing prices (from the California Association of Realtors), the change in yearly number of establishments per population (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)), and the change in yearly payroll paid per population (from BLS). I include these variables alone and interacted with Disaster to remove the level e¤ect and capture the economic damage of the disaster. The summary statistics and correlations of these variables are included in Table 4 .
Second, to directly address the structure-to-land value story (that disasters impact structures more and up-and-coming communities have relatively more land value), I
collect the time series of zip-code level residential building value per permit issued from Rand. I utilize the lag of average zip code residential building permits in the matched sample to capture, all else equal, how much construction cost goes into a community.
Presumably, up-and-coming areas have more money being invested in the community. 14 Panel B of Table 4 shows that building permits are capturing something more than just house values. The correlation of building permit values with house prices is signi…cant but small (0.096). Building permits is instead more positively correlated with payroll (0.548), changes in payroll (0.147) and establishments (0.227). These correlations are at least consistent with building permits capturing some up-and-coming nature of communities.
To address the service economy orientation of the zip code (that service communities re-trench quickly), I proxy service orientation with McDonalds locations from the GIS website http://www.poi-factory.com. 15 The justi…cation for using McDonalds as a proxy comes from the fact that McDonalds targets locations in high tra¢ c corridors (stated in their policy) combined with the intuition that all else equal, high tra¢ c corridors are likely to contain services, especially given that I have already controlled for measures of commercial activity. 16 Table 4 is not related to payroll in either direction, which suggests that it is not capturing an income dimension.
Main Results Controlling for Resiliency
Turning to the estimations, Column 1 of Table 5 Column 8 of Table 5 We can easily translate these to rates for comparison to current events. The sample mean annual foreclosure rate is 0.972% (=0.243% x 4 quarters) of homes. After a disaster, column 9 implies that the rate increases to 1.55% of homes, and column 8 implies that the rate increase to 1.43%. As a comparison, the 2009 foreclosure rate in California (from RealtyTrac) was 1.88%, larger but quite comparable with a disaster e¤ect. In my most conservative estimations, payday lenders mitigate from 0.10% to 0.13% of the foreclosure rate (1.0-1.3 foreclosures per 1,000 people) following a disaster.
At the risk of over-qualifying, I want to emphasize how these numbers apply and do not apply to non-natural disaster situations. My design uses natural disasters as a natural experiment for …nancial shocks inducing distress. I do not claim that payday lenders lower the foreclosure rate by 0.10% to 0.13% in general. Rather, among those going to payday lenders following a …nancial shock (personal emergency or natural disaster), lenders have a large mitigating e¤ect in helping these individuals catch up with their obligations before facing foreclosures. Some individuals use payday lending as a very expensive form of ordinary medium term …nance for non-distress situations. My results do not apply to them.
Placebo Test and Instrumental Variables Robustness
As robustness I …rst use the fact that I can categorize disasters into those which insurance is unlikely to cover (earthquakes, ‡oods, landslides, storms, wild…res and coastal damage) and those in which it is often included in homeowners policies (hail, lightning, tornadoes and wind). I can use the insured disasters as a placebo; I should not …nd an e¤ect of lenders. Table 6 , columns 2 and 3 shows exactly this: the payday lending variables interacted with Disaster are insigni…cant. Columns 3 and 4 are the subsample of insu¢ ciently insured disasters for which the payday mitigation e¤ect is apparent.
As a …nal test of robustness using the foreclosure dependent variable, I …nd an instru- 
Small Property Crime Results
As an additional test, I turn now to the small property crime dependent variables, following Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006) . Table 7 reports the results for the three small property crime variables -larceny, vehicle theft and burglary. The dependent variable is the change in annual crimes per household, where change is de…ned to be the average crimes in the year of the disaster (aligned for the match group) minus the average foreclosure rate in the year prior to the disaster. I include the same resiliency covariatesestablishments and community payroll per capita,-but instead of house prices, I include violent crimes as a natural covariate.
Columns 1 and 2 shows that natural disasters increase larcenies by about 12 per 1,000
households per year, compared to a mean of 60 crimes per 1,000 households per year.
The negative signi…cant coe¢ cient on Lender Disaster implies that the disaster-driven increase in larcenies is mitigated when a lender is accessible. I qualify this result that the signi…cance is weaker, but nevertheless, the larceny result supports that main foreclosure results. Payday lending seems to o¤er those in distress with an option to weather …nancial distress.
Turning to the other small property crimes, the remaining columns reports that payday lenders play no role in people's decisions to engage in vehicle thefts or burglaries.
The only independent variables that explains any of the variation in the changes in these crimes is the change in violent crimes (very strongly) and payroll (weakly). Perhaps it is intuitive that in times of …nancial distress, the bene…t from access to credit matters only for the smallest of the small property crimes, e.g., shoplifting, where the connection between the need for cash and criminal action is arguably the most direct.
Conclusions
Taking advantage of the exogenous shock of natural disasters in a matched triple difference framework, I …nd that the existence of payday lending increases welfare for households who may face foreclosures or be driven into small property crime in times of …nancial distress. Speci…cally, the main paper result is that foreclosures increase dramatically (4.5 more foreclosures per 1,000 homes) in the year following a natural disaster, however, 1.0-1.3 of the 4.5 increase is mitigated by access to a lender. The implication is that access to …nance can be welfare improving, even at 400% APR. Payday lending also discourages shoplifting but does not factor into decisions of more serious crimes such as vehicle thefts and burglaries.
A quali…cation is that welfare-improvement comes from the mitigating role of payday lenders following shock-driven distress. If the existence of payday lending is valuable for those facing personal disaster, then regulators should strive to make access to …nance easier and more a¤ordable for those facing distress. However, this does not mean that payday lending is the best product conceivable, but it does suggest that e¤orts should be focused on opening up the market for product innovation in (cheaper) high-risk and short-term personal …nance to help those in need. 1. The dependent variable is the change in quarterly foreclosures per owner occupied home around the natural disaster or its match in time, where the pre-period is the four quarters before the event and the post period is quarters 4-7 after the disaster. 2. The analysis is at the quarterly, zip code level, with only one observation per disaster zip code (and its match). 3. Distress is equal to (ρ + f dis -ρf dis ), where ρ is the propensity of the community to be financially constrained and f dis indicates a natural disaster. Disaster=f dis.
The independent variable
Lender is an indicator for a lender in the community. The dependent variables Lender 10 Miles and Lender 20 Miles are the log of the count of payday lenders within 10 or 20 miles from the center of the zip code. 5. Year dummy variables are included but not shown. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Variables are all defined in the data section of the paper. 2. All variable summaries represent statistics from the sample used, not the population in California. 3. In Panel B, * indicates that the correlation is significant at the 5% level.
